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Nations around the world, including the United States, have been battling terrorist 
hostage-takings by instituting “no-concessions” policies. The hope is that denying 
terrorists their demands will remove all incentives for hostage-taking, thereby eliminating 
its practice. However, since this policy has been in existence, research has shown that 
hostage-takings have increased. Considering the recent, highly publicized beheadings of 
hostages held by the Islamic State, is there a better policy option, such as one that 
protects U.S. citizens who are being held hostage? To answer this question, this thesis 
conducted a policy options analysis. Criteria were developed from the literature, and the 
current U.S. policy was compared to two other policy options. The research found that 
current U.S. policy does not effectively achieve its goals and, as such, does not offer the 
best protection to U.S. citizens. As a result, the thesis concluded that the United States 
would be better served by removing the no-concessions rule and focusing on a policy that 
punishes terrorists who participate in hostage-taking. 
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When terrorists take hostages, they do so to instill fear and make a nation appear 
powerless. To counter this fear and protect citizens from hostage-takings, countries, 
including the United States, have implemented “no-concessions” policies. These policies 
are designed to deny terrorists’ demands, thus removing incentives for—and thereby 
eliminating—hostage-takings. Research has shown, however, that hostage-takings have 
increased over the years despite no-concessions policies. To determine if no-concessions 
policies actually deter hostage-takings, this research conducted a policy options analysis. 
Using criteria developed from a literature review, the current U.S. policy was compared 
to two other policy options. The research found that current U.S. policy does not 
effectively achieve its goals and, as such, does not offer the best protection to U.S. 
citizens. The United States would be better served by removing the no-concessions rule 
and focusing on a policy that punishes terrorists who participate in hostage-takings.  
Throughout U.S. history, refusing to grant concessions has been the foundation of 
terrorist-negotiation policy. Behavioral logic dictates that removing incentives deters 
hostage-taking, thus ending the cycle of terrorism. While having a no-concessions policy 
does appear to be logical, it is based on beliefs; and beliefs alone are not a valid tool for 
formulating policy. In an attempt to understand why the current U.S. policy has 
performed so poorly, this research answered three questions: Does having a no-
concessions policy deter hostage-taking? Does paying ransoms really fund terrorism? 
Does the policy allow for consistency and equality?  
Does having a no-concessions policy deter hostage-taking? Studies have 
indicated that maintaining a no-concessions policy does not deter hostage-taking. 
Research by terrorism experts and economists explains that there is always a value in 
obtaining hostages beyond monetary considerations, such as the value of publicity, and a 
no-concessions policy does not diminish that value. Quantitative data from the Global 
Terrorism Database supports these claims, indicating that hostage-taking incidents have 
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been on the rise since 1970.1 As hostage-takings involving American citizens has not 
declined as a result of the no-concessions policy, the policy is ineffective and a revision 
should be considered.    
Does paying ransoms really fund terrorism? One of the newest justifications for 
having a no-concessions policy is that granting ransoms funds terrorism. It is without 
question that any money given to a terrorist organization helps fund that organization; 
however, the research shows that the impact of ransom payments is inconsequential to the 
overall funding of a terrorist organization. For instance, ISIS receives about $20.8 million 
a year in ransom payments.2 Their estimated yearly income is $2 billion.3 In context, 
ransoms make up approximately one percent of ISIS’ average annual income. 
Eliminating this funding does nothing to remove the threat they pose. Economic studies 
have indicated that hostage-takings more often occur not out of want for money, but 
because the offenders lack fear of retribution. For the Somali pirates, for example, 
successful ransom payouts were a minor factor in repeat hostage-takings. Rather, because 
the country of Somalia does not contain a strong central government, the pirates have no 
fear of prosecution. Because fear of retribution is a successful deterrent to hostage-taking, 
the U.S. policy should be less concerned about ransoms and should focus more on a 
policy that will bring hostage-takers to justice.       
Does the policy allow for consistency and equality? No-concessions policies are 
often violated. For example, the United States sold arms to Iran for the release of 
hostages during the Iran-Contra affair. Policy violations cause confusion and mistrust not 
only with other governments, but also with U.S. citizens. This was evident when the 
United States chose to negotiate a prisoner release for Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl in 
exchange for five Taliban terrorists, but did nothing for American journalist James Foley, 
who was later beheaded by members of ISIS. Although the U.S. no-concession policy 
                                                 
1  “Global Terrorism Database,” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to 
Terrorism (START), accessed March 14, 2016, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/. 
2 Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” New York Times, July 29, 
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/. 
3 John Hall, “New Study of ISIS Income Suggests $2billion a Year Estimate Is Too low,” Daily Mail, 
March 20, 2015, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3003919/Are-ISIS-earning-2billion-year-New-
study-terror-group-s-income-suggests-previous-estimates-far-low.html. 
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was designed to address these inequities, maintaining the policy appears to hinder any 
efforts for equality. History has demonstrated that a no-concessions policy will continue 
to be violated and, as such, equality will remain intangible.    
On all counts, maintaining the no-concessions rule has rendered the current policy 
ineffective at protecting U.S. citizens during hostage-taking events. Having this rule in 
the policy limits the flexibility needed to conduct negotiations. It reduces options and 
limits outcomes. If negotiators cannot discuss the possibility of ransom payments, 
prisoner releases, or other acts of concessions, negotiations can be one-sided and 
ineffective. The strict no-concessions rule also opens the policy up to violation. Every 
hostage situation is different, and having a blanket policy, especially one that is 
restricting, does not allow for the safe return of hostages. In addition, rigid policies that 
cannot be upheld make countries appear weak. A no-concessions policy sounds strong, 
but when nations are forced to violate their own policies, they lose credibility.  
As a result of the research, it is strongly recommended that the United States 
remove the no-concessions language from its policy. Moreover, because the research 
indicated that the fear of retribution can be a deterrent to hostage-taking, the United 
States should stress a pursue, capture, or kill policy for terrorists who commit hostage-
takings. While it is impossible to prevent every hostage-taking incident, these 
recommendations will reduce the likelihood that U.S. citizens are taken hostage and, 
more importantly, increase the chances of their safe return when they are abducted.  
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The topic of negotiating with terrorists often draws contentious arguments. When 
asked if the nation should negotiate with terrorist organizations in exchange for American 
hostages’ lives, a 2014 Gallup poll demonstrated that Americans were almost evenly 
divided. According to Gallup, “Forty-three percent say it is more important for the U.S. 
to secure the safe release of prisoners, even if that means compromising with terrorist 
demands, while 44% say it is more important to discourage future prisoner-taking by 
refusing to negotiate with terrorist groups, even if that means risking the lives of the U.S. 
prisoners.”1 By a slight margin, the poll indicates that most Americans believe a logical 
truth: negotiating and granting concessions to terrorists puts others in danger of being 
taken hostage.  
The United States outlines this logic as one of the primary reasons its government 
makes no concessions with terrorists—out of the fear that it will incentivize the terrorists 
to repeat their tactics. Both current and past U.S. policies have maintained that the 
government will “deny hostage-takers the benefits of ransom, prisoner releases, policy 
changes, or other acts of concession.”2 This decision, explains the U.S. Department of 
State (DOS), is based on the belief that “paying ransom or making other concessions to 
terrorists in exchange for the release of hostages increases the danger that others will be 
taken.”3 However, beliefs alone are not a valid tool for forming policy regarding terrorist 
hostage-takings.  
Traditionally, the United States has had a policy against negotiating with 
terrorists. But with the recent beheadings of some American hostages at the hands of 
terrorists, that policy has been reviewed and revised. In the summer of 2015, the White 
                                                 
1 Jeffrey Jones, “Americans Divided on Wisdom of U.S. Prisoner Negotiations,” Gallup, June 11, 
2014, http://www.gallup.com/poll/171395/americans-divided-wisdom-prisoner-negotiations.aspx. 
2 “7 FAM 1820: Hostage-taking and Kidnappings,” U.S. Department of State, August 11, 2014, 5, 
https://fam.state.gov/searchapps/viewer?format=html&query=7%20fam%201820%20hostage&links=7,FA
M,1820,HOSTAG&url=/FAM/07FAM/07FAM1820.html. 
3 Bureau of Public Affairs, “Fact Sheet: International Terrorism—American Hostages,” U.S. 
Department of State Dispatch 6, no. 43 (October 23, 1995): Article 10. 
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House released the Report on U.S. Hostage Policy in an effort to provide better support 
for hostages and their families. This report resulted in Presidential Policy Directive 
(PPD)-30 and Executive Order 13698, which form the policy for hostage recovery 
activities. The policy keeps its firm “no-concessions” rule but now allows for direct 
communication with terrorist hostage-takers. It also gives families the ability to pay 
ransoms for the safe return of their relatives.  
While the policy does make sweeping changes by allowing negotiations, it 
contradicts the no-concessions clause by permitting families the ability to pay ransoms. 
With lives at stake, it is important to understand relevant material concerning the topic of 
negotiating with terrorists. This thesis analyzes the new policy on hostage recovery and 
offers recommendations for the best policy option to protect U.S. citizens from this type 
of terrorist activity.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Even though the United States has taken steps to improve its ability to recover 
American hostages held abroad, it is uncertain whether or not the new policy will be 
effective at negotiating and protecting U.S. citizens from terrorist hostage-takings. 
Because the policy retains the no-concessions clause, it may still be unable to achieve 
these goals. Moreover, the United States has consistently violated the no-concessions rule 
by negotiating and granting concessions to terrorists; an example is the Iran-Contra affair, 
during which the United States traded arms for hostages and arranged the prisoner 
exchange involving Bowe Bergdahl. Policy application contradictions like these cause 
confusion, and lead to questions about the U.S. government’s integrity, strength, and 
wisdom.  
In order to address these problems, the research focused on the effectiveness of 
maintaining a no-concession policy. While the research explores this issue as well as 
others that inevitably arise in connection with negotiation policies, the following 
questions are the primary focus:  
 
 3 
• How does the U.S. no-concessions policy impact hostage recovery 
activities when negotiating with terrorists? 
• What other policy options might best help the United States protect its 
citizens? 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis intended to answer the research questions by conducting a policy 
options analysis. To effectively do so, Eugene Bardach’s policy analysis process was 
followed.4 Alternative policies were developed, criteria were established based on the 
literature, and then the policy options were evaluated.  
Three policy alternatives were established: maintaining the current policy of no 
concessions, granting ransom payments or other acts of concessions without limits, and 
removing the no-concessions language. The policy options were then measured against 
four criteria to determine their effectiveness during hostage-takings. The majority of the 
criteria were established as a result of analyzing the recurring themes in the nation’s 
policy throughout its historical development. After the policy alternatives and criteria 
were established, the next stage was to design a scoring system (described in more detail 
in Chapter IV) and evaluate the options. Once the policy options were scored, they were 
totaled and ranked. The highest number indicated the optimal policy for the United 
States. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The two major arguments against negotiating with terrorists are clear. Some say 
negotiating encourages more terrorism by giving into their demands and putting lives at 
risk.5 Others argue that negotiating legitimizes terrorists and undermines international 
efforts to eliminate terrorism.6 Although most of the research on negotiating with 
terrorists approaches the topic in the broader sense, discussing the overall peace process 
                                                 
4 Eugene Bardach and Eric M. Patashnik, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis: The Eightfold Path to 
More Effective Problem Solving (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2015). 
5 A. Murady, “Negotiating with Terrorists Encourages More Terrorism,” Daily Outlook Afghanistan, 
February 18, 2014, http://outlookafghanistan.net/topics.php?post_id=9427. 
6 Peter R. Neumann, “Negotiating With Terrorists,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 1 (February 2007): 128. 
 4 
rather than specific hostage situations, the two topics are closely related. A review of the 
literature indicates that there are many positive and negative outcomes associated with 
negotiating. Decision makers should consider all these benefits and pitfalls when 
determining a better policy. This literature review covers the major arguments against, as 
well as the pros and cons of, negotiating. 
1. Negotiating with Terrorists Causes More Terrorism 
Some authors argue that negotiating causes more terrorism. Duyvesteyn and 
Schuurman, along with Clutterbuck and Hayes, confirm their group hypothesis: 
negotiations that lead to concessions can cause terrorists to repeat certain acts of 
terrorism.7 However, in making this statement, none of these authors reference past 
research or offer any empirical evidence to support their claim. Though they feel that 
granting concessions leads to more terrorism, few state that it should prevent negotiations 
from taking place.  
A policy brief from the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) claims that “the degree to which ... [terrorists] achieve their demands,” not the 
negotiation process itself, causes them to perpetuate actions.8 In other words, if 
negotiations always result in conceding to any or all of the terrorists’ demands, they may 
repeat their tactics. William Zartman confirms this in his writings, declaring that if 
negotiations result in concessions, such as news interviews or radio publicity instead of 
ransom payments, for example, the terrorists are “more likely to decide that the result is 
not worth the effort, rather than to feel encouraged to do it again.”9 In contrast, as 
proposed by IIASA, if the negotiations lead to ransom payments or appeasements, 
                                                 
7 Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Bart Schuurman, “The Paradoxes of Negotiating with Terrorist and 
Insurgent Organisations,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 39, no. 4 (2011): 677, doi: 
10.1080/03086534.2011.615612. 
8 International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), “Negotiating with Terrorists: A 
Mediator’s Guide,” IIASA Policy Brief, no. 6 (March 2009), http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/resources/
publications/IIASAPolicyBriefs/pb06.html. 
9 I. William Zartman, “Negotiating with Terrorists,” International Negotiation 8, no. 3 (September 
2003): 448–449. 
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terrorists are more likely to continue their tactics.10 It is the negotiation’s outcome—not 
the act of negotiating itself—that encourages them to repeat acts of terrorism.11  
Pruitt argues that states are generally against negotiating because it rewards 
terrorist violence, and negotiating is often categorized as capitulation.12 Governments 
therefore prefer combat, as Pruitt puts it, “because it requires no concessions, grants no 
legitimacy, and is consistent with the norm of punishing illegal violence.”13 However, 
negotiations are not synonymous with capitulation or concessions. As Pruitt and others 
have affirmed, negotiating should not be equated with granting concessions. 
Clutterbuck’s research cites several examples of the negative outcomes of negotiating 
with terrorist groups. Despite these outcomes, he admits that governments should never 
refuse to negotiate even if they refuse to grant concessions.14 
Published writings tend to agree that simply granting concessions may encourage 
certain types of terrorists to actively pursue ransom payments or prisoner exchanges; 
however, the literature does not imply that all types of terrorists will participate in these 
activities. Although many authors agree that granting concessions leads to more 
terrorism, they offer no quantitative data or research to support this claim—this lack of 
data indicates a major gap in understanding a no-concessions policy.  
2. Negotiating with Terrorists Gives Them Legitimacy 
Another argument against negotiating with and granting concessions to terrorists 
is that it gives terrorists legitimacy. Peter Neumann, though he does not concur, outlines 
the most popular argument among scholars in his field: “Democracies must never give in 
to violence, and terrorists must never be rewarded for using it. Negotiations give 
legitimacy to terrorists and their methods and undermine actors who have pursued 
                                                 
10 IIASA, “Negotiating with Terrorists.” 
11 Ibid. 
12 Dean G. Pruitt, “Negotiation with Terrorists,” International Negotiation 11, no. 2 (May 2006): 371–
385, doi: 10.1163/157180606778968290. 
13 Pruitt, “Negotiation with Terrorists,” 373. 
14 Richard Clutterbuck, “Negotiating with Terrorists,” Terrorism and Political Violence 4, no. 4 
(December 1, 1992): 277, doi: 10.1080/09546559208427186. 
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political change through peaceful means.”15 Duyvesteyn and Schuurman’s research 
similarly suggests that terrorists often seek out negotiations to improve their legitimacy: 
“Talks appear to legitimize the aims and strength, if not the methods, of terrorist groups, 
thus elevating their status from violent criminals to potent political activists.”16 Former 
Afghan National Directorate of Security Amrualla Saleh, discussing the United States’ 
willigness to negotiate with the Taliban, says, “Negotiating with the Taliban after more 
than 10 years of fighting means giving legitimacy and space to militant extremism.”17 In 
essence, Saleh believes that negotiations recognize and legitimize the Taliban’s violence 
and atrocities. Such negotiations could prompt other terrorist groups to commit violent 
acts for resolution.  
Harmonie Toros acknowledges Saleh’s common argument against negotiating, 
commenting, “A key objection raised by terrorism scholars and policymakers against 
engaging in negotiations with terrorists is that it legitimizes terrorist groups, their goals 
and their means. Talking to them would serve only to incite more violence and weaken 
the fabric of democratic states, they argue.”18 However, Toros suggests that other 
scholars are overlooking the fact that governments require terrorists to cease violence 
during negotiations, and because the terrorists are obligated to end attacks once a solution 
is reached, the norm of nonviolence is actually strengthened during negotiations.19 
Toros’s research suggests that granting legitimacy may be a necessary step in resolving 
conflict and stopping the cycle of terrorism. Groups typically use terrorism to 
communicate political change because they feel that an injustice has been committed and 
that there are no peaceful avenues for reparation.20 Negotiating, according to Toros, 
provides terrorists a nonviolent alternative to communicate; it provides them with ingress 
                                                 
15 Neumann, “Negotiating With Terrorists,” 128. 
16 Duyvesteyn and Schuurman, “Paradoxes,” 668. 
17 Amrullah Saleh, “Why Negotiate With the Taliban?” Wall Street Journal, February 10, 2012, sec. 
Opinion, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970204136404577207500541175714. 
18 Harmonie Toros, “‘We Don’t Negotiate with Terrorists!’: Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist 
Conflicts,” Security Dialogue 39, no. 4 (August 1, 2008): 407, doi: 10.1177/0967010608094035. 
19 Toros, “We Don’t Negotiate,” 412. 
20 Ibid., 414. 
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into the political mainstream and a departure from terrorism as a form of communication. 
In contrast, if a state refuses to negotiate and accept a group’s legitimacy, it can lead to 
further radicalization and a repeated cycle of terrorism.21 Finally, says Toros, 
“Negotiating with ‘terrorists’ can indeed lead to their legitimation, but through this very 
legitimation it may offer ‘terrorists’ an alternative path and the chance to transform into 
nonviolent actors.”22 The importance of Toros’ research is that, instead of avoiding the 
argument over granting legitimacy, she addresses the importance of granting it to terrorist 
groups as a necessary step to the peace process.  
3. Pros and Cons of Negotiating 
Many authors do not necessarily oppose negotiating; much literature focuses on 
illuminating both the benefits and potential consequences of negotiating with terrorists. 
Neumann writes: “The most obvious and profound benefit to talking to groups that use 
terror is to hasten an end to the violence and produce a sustainable peace.”23 By 
involving terrorists in the negotiation process, they become part of the solution instead of 
part of the problem.24 As Zartman emphasizes, “As in any negotiations, when the two 
parties become convinced that a search for a solution is legitimate and acceptable to both 
sides, they become joint searchers for a solution to a problem rather than adversaries.”25 
Negotiating is the first step in the peace process; it is a necessary element to a peaceful 
solution that brings both sides together.  
Zartman’s work further argues that negotiating can weaken support for violence 
and boost moderate members of terrorist groups.26 Most groups commit terrorist acts as a 
form of communication; therefore, when governments want to communicate with 
terrorist groups, it oftentimes encourages members to engage in peaceful talks. Toros 
supports Zartman’s claim, agreeing that negotiations can strengthen moderates within the 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 422. 
23 Neumann, “Negotiating With Terrorists,” 128–38. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Zartman, “Negotiating with Terrorists,” 448–49. 
26 Ibid. 
 8 
group who desire political change through nonviolence. In addition, Toros believes 
negotiating “can also lead to the slow transformation of the entire group into one 
adhering to the norms of nonviolent political debate.”27 
Audrey Cronin, too, agrees that negotiating can boost moderates and separate 
them from the group’s hardliners—a phenomenon called splintering.28 Duyvesteyn and 
Schuurman argue that splintering causes more violence: “Negotiations are virtually never 
seen as a positive development by all subgroups of the insurgent or terrorist organization. 
This can lead to the formation of splinter groups who view talks as a betrayal of 
principles or who fear that the outcomes of negotiations will limit their power.”29 Cronin 
further postulates that splintering can increase violence, but suggests that it can also 
isolate and potentially strangle the most radical factions of the group.30 She feels that 
negotiations should be regarded as long-term solutions that require patience, flexibility, 
extensive intelligence, and determination; however, Cronin ultimately concludes that, 
regardless of the antiterrorism campaign a state imposes, terrorist organizations typically 
die out over time as a result of their own destructive devices.  
Quinney and Coyne point out another benefit of negotiating—that it redirects the 
terrorists’ attention. While it is possible that talks may not lead to a resolution, 
negotiations are often accompanied by a cease-fire.31 Quinney and Coyne cite a study 
that found “about half of the terrorist groups involved in negotiations continued to use 
violence, but the intensity and frequency of the violence declined as talks dragged on.”32 
Opponents of negotiating, such as Cronin, argue that cease-fires allow terrorists to 
regroup and rearm.33 Duyvesteyn and Schuurman list this action as the first paradox in 
                                                 
27 Toros, “We Don’t Negotiate,” 413. 
28 Audrey Kurth Cronin, When Should We Talk to Terrorists? (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace, May 2010), 1–13, http://www.usip.org/publications/when-should-we-talk-terrorists. 
29 Duyvesteyn and Schuurman, “Paradoxes,” 668. 
30 Cronin, When Should We Talk to Terrorists?, 1–13. 
31 Nigel Quinney and A. Heather Coyne, Talking to Groups That Use Terror (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011), 17. 
32 Quinney and Coyne, Talking to Groups. 
33 Cronin, When Should We Talk to Terrorists?, 1–13. 
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negotiating with terrorists: negotiations can mask violent motives, and terrorist groups 
typically enter into them to gain a tactical advantage.34 Quinney and Coyne’s points are 
slightly contradictory; they argue that not every negotiation will be successful, but 
entering into negotiations can save lives by occupying the group’s time and focus. This 
distraction can hinder a terrorist group’s ability to conduct attacks while negotiations are 
taking place.35 
Quinney and Coyne list intelligence gathering as a key component in negotiations 
and another effective counterterrorism tool. They explain, “Talking is a good way to find 
out more about the terrorists’ goals, priorities, and sensitivities—all of which can easily 
be missed or misconstrued when a group is demonized and isolated.”36 States miss 
important information and intelligence that can resolve conflicts when they employ 
policies against negotiating.  
The literature review on negotiating with terrorists identified many valid 
considerations, including its positive and negative outcomes. The United States’ current 
policy allows for direct negotiations with terrorists; however, maintaining the no-
concessions rule endangers negotiations. It limits negotiators’ abilities and resources, 
which ultimately hinders their ability to successfully negotiate.  
                                                 
34 Duyvesteyn and Schuurman, “Paradoxes.” 
35 Quinney and Coyne, Talking to Groups, 17–18. 
36 Ibid., 18. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. WHAT IS TERRORISM? 
Analyzing terrorism is not an easy task. The topic’s subjective nature makes it 
almost impossible to classify and define. What is considered an act of liberty to one 
person may be considered terrorism to another. This is why it is so difficult to identify 
acts of terrorism and why terrorism, as a word, has never been truly defined. This precise 
difficult was demonstrated in the case of Joseph Stack, who deliberately flew his plane 
into an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) office building in Austin, Texas. Stack, according 
to his manifesto, was upset with the IRS and the U.S. tax system.37 In his suicide note, 
Stack expressed anger toward big businesses like General Motors, which received bailout 
money from the federal government, and the Catholic Church, which receives tax-exempt 
status from the IRS. His writings expressed frustration with the U.S. government over his 
IRS problems and politicians’ lack of concern.38 Stack, in his manifesto, also encouraged 
more people to wake up and fight against the government.39 During the attack, Stack 
killed one IRS employee and injured several others. 
Some accused the government of downplaying Stack’s actions; news sources 
quoted homeland security officials as originally saying, “We believe there’s no nexus 
with criminal or terrorist activity.”40 Reporter Glenn Greenwald took the opposite 
approach, pointing out that Stack’s actions were an act of terrorism.41 News reporters and 
political bloggers seemed divided on the issue; some reported that, because Stack 
suffered from mental illness and suicidal tendencies, his acts should not be considered 
                                                 
37 Joe Weisenthal, “The Insane Manifesto of Austin Texas Crash Pilot Joseph Andrew Stack,” 
Business Insider, February 2, 2010, http://www.businessinsider.com/joseph-andrew-stacks-insane-
manifesto-2010-2. 
38 Weisenthal, “The Insane Manifesto.” 
39 Ibid. 
40 David Neiwert, “Huh? Since When Is Attempting To Blow up a Federal Building NOT an Act of 
Domestic Terrorism?,” Crooks and Liars, February 18, 2010, http://crooksandliars.com/david-neiwert/huh-
when-attempting-blow-federal-bui. 
41 Glenn Greenwald, “Terrorism: The Most Meaningless and Manipulated Word,” Salon, accessed 
December 20, 2015, http://www.salon.com/2010/02/19/terrorism_19/. 
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terrorism.42 While the mental illness argument may appear to have some merit, it is 
diminished by the fact that Theodore Kaczynski, also known as the Unabomber, is 
considered a major terrorist according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).43 
Kaczynski, who could have been described as a recluse, sent a number of bombs through 
the U.S. Postal Service. His manifesto shows his hatred of industrial society and 
technology. After his writings were published, Kaczynski was caught, but not before his 
bombs killed three people and injured 23 others. Because of his self-contained life and 
atypical ways, Kaczynski was examined by several psychiatrists who diagnosed him as 
suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.44 Kaczynski, similar to Stack, wrote an 
antiestablishment manifesto and carried out attacks against his hated institution. and 
although they both seemingly suffered from mental illnesses, Kaczynski was classified as 
a terrorist and Stack was not.  
Another attack on U.S. soil committed by a U.S. citizen occurred when a truck 
bomb was detonated in Oklahoma City, destroying the Murrah Federal Building. The 
explosion killed 187 people, 19 of them children.45 It was later learned that Timothy 
McVeigh and his co-conspirator Terry Nichols were responsible for the bombing. Both 
McVeigh and Nichols developed antigovernment ideology, most of which steamed from 
tragic events at Ruby Ridge and Waco, in which federal agents killed U.S. citizens.46 
McVeigh and Nichols felt that the U.S. government had violated these people’s 
constitutional rights, and it was only a matter of time before others were next.  
Although Stack’s attack and the McVeigh-Nichols Oklahoma City bombing were 
virtually the same, there was little question that McVeigh and Nichols had committed a 
                                                 
42 Heather Horn, “Should We Call the IRS Attack Terrorism?,” The Wire, February 19, 2010, 
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2010/02/should-we-call-the-irs-attack-terrorism/25460/. 
43 “Major Terrorism Cases,” FBI, accessed January 9, 2016, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/
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44 Stephen Diamond, “Terrorism, Resentment and the Unabomber,” Psychology Today, accessed 
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unabomber. 
45 “Oklahoma City Bombing—Facts & Summary,” History.com, accessed December 20, 2015, 
http://www.history.com/topics/oklahoma-city-bombing. 
46 Douglas Linder, “The Oklahoma City Bombing & the Trial of Timothy McVeigh,” University of 
Missouri-Kansas City, 2006, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mcveigh/mcveighaccount.html. 
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terrorist attack. In both events, the perpetrators hated the government, attacked a federal 
building, intended to change the government by the attack, wanted to inspire others with 
their actions, used weapons that caused mass destruction, and intended to instill fear and 
kill people. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, the FBI and several news 
agencies, the Oklahoma City bombing is considered the worst act of homegrown 
terrorism.47 Yet despite their similarities, the FBI continued to insist during the Stack 
investigation that it was a criminal matter and not terrorism.48 Moreover, in CNN’s most 
up-to-date tally of terrorist attacks in the United States, the Unabomber incident and the 
Oklahoma City bombing are both listed, but not Stack’s violence is not.49 These 
comparisons illustrate how complex it can be to identify acts of terrorism.  
Categorizing terrorist actions has been proven to be enigmatic; defining terrorism 
is just as elusive. In fact, three separate U.S. government agencies define terrorism 
differently. The United States Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the unlawful 
use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other 
ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals 
that are usually political.”50 According to the FBI’s website, international and domestic 
terrorism includes the following core activities: “Violent acts or acts dangerous to human 
life that violate federal or state law; appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; 
or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or 
                                                 
47 John Jenkins, Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v., “Oklahoma City Bombing,” accessed December 20, 
2015, http://www.britannica.com/event/Oklahoma-City-bombing; “Terror Hits Home: The Oklahoma City 
Bombing,” FBI, accessed December 20, 2015, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/
oklahoma-city-bombing/oklahoma-city-bombing; Lydia Smith, “Oklahoma City Bombing 20th 
Anniversary: 20 Facts about the 1995 Attack,” International Business Times UK, April 18, 2015, 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/oklahoma-city-bombing-anniversary-20-facts-about-1995-attack-1497033. 
48 Glenn Greenwald, “Refusal to Call Charleston Shootings ‘Terrorism’ Again Shows It’s a 
Meaningless Propaganda Term,” The Intercept, June 19, 2015, https://theintercept.com/2015/06/19/refusal-
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49 “U.S. Terrorist Attacks Fast Facts,” CNN, accessed December 23, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2013/
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50 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint 
Publication 1-02) (U.S. Department of Defense, January 2016), 241, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/
new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. 
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kidnapping.”51 Lastly, the DOS defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically-motivated 
violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine 
agents.”52 A standard definition of terrorism has eluded the United States and the 
international community.  
The United Nations (UN) Office on Drugs and Crime admits that a clear 
definition for the word terrorism has eluded governments for years.53 The popular quote, 
“one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” articulates the UN’s perspective. 
According to Boaz Ganor, a survey of leading academics in the field of terrorism 
generated 109 different definitions of terrorism.54 As Ganor acknowledges, “Most 
researchers tend to believe that an objective and internationally accepted definition of 
terrorism can never be agreed upon.”55 Christian Walter confirms this point in his 
manuscript entitled “Defining Terrorism in National and International Law.” Walter 
points out that the term freedom fighters and the potential for accusing a state’s officials 
of terrorism has confounded the debate.56 A summary of the UN’s discussions explains 
that “several delegations stressed a need to differentiate between terrorism and the 
legitimate right of peoples to resist foreign occupation.”57  
Bruce Hoffman attributes the difficulty in defining terrorism to its changing 
meaning over the past 200 years.58 In his book, Inside Terrorism, Hoffman explains how 
the word terrorism was first popularized during the French Revolution and had a positive 
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Media Asia 29, no. 3 (2002): 123. 
55 Ganor, “Defining Terrorism,” 123. 
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connotation at the time. For a while, it was associated with successful revolutionary 
movements, but over time it has become known as violence directed against governments 
and their leaders.59 The word’s positive and negative connotations have swayed back and 
forth throughout history depending on the regime and war taking place at the time. 
Currently, the word has become synonymous with evil, hate, fear, and a multitude of 
other negative feelings. As Carl Miller and Adrien Guelke put it, “Terrorism is a 
powerful member of the family of moral-descriptive vocabulary .… Indeed, it is probably 
one of the most condemnatory words in the English language.”60  
Terrorism as a word is subjective, and there may never be an agreed-upon 
definition. This absent consensus, however, does not suggest the term has no meaning, 
nor does it discount its negative stigma. Terrorism carries the connotation of the ultimate 
evil. As a result of the word’s pejorative meaning and related emotions, it cannot function 
as a neutral descriptor.61 Terrorism is intended to produce devastating injuries, 
destruction, and death. At its linguistic root is the word terror—designed to instill fear, 
uncertainty, and vulnerability.62 These emotional responses to the word make it nearly 
impossible for people to accept that negotiating or granting concession to terrorists could 
be a positive thing, and it inevitably stigmatizes a hostage’s plight in a negative way. 
Because the word and its actions are of such a subjective nature, and because of the 
negative association attached to them, reconsidering the word terrorism’s use in U.S. 
policy for hostage recovery activities is merited.  
B. HISTORY OF TERRORISM  
Terrorism is not a new concept. Although there is no definitive date of the first 
terrorist act, terrorism as we know it dates back over 2,000 years. Bongar et al. suggest, 
“In 48 A.D., a Jewish sect called the Zealots carried out terrorist campaigns to force an 
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insurrection against the Romans in Judea.”63 The Zealots, as Bongar et al. describe, 
would commit terrorist acts such as kidnappings for ransoms, assassinations, and mass 
poisonings for the purpose of instilling terror into the Romans and Jewish sympathizers.64 
Most of the killings took place during daylight hours so people could see these horrific 
acts as they were happening and report back to the Romans.65 
The Barbary pirates were the first terrorist group that America ever faced. Their 
actions, which included taking hostages for ransom and demanding payment for safe 
passage, made them a contingent terrorist group. In 1785, the United States negotiated to 
pay tribute to the pirates, just as every other nation at the time did, to prevent the pirates 
from seizing ships and taking the crews hostage.66 Despite America’s yearly ransom 
payments, U.S. ships were still being attacked and seized, and ransoms increased as 
American sailors were repeatedly taken hostage. The Barbary pirates’ practice of 
continually demanding more money eventually resulted in the Tripolitan War of 1801.  
Those who are against granting concessions to terrorists argue that events from 
the past, such as dealings with the Barbary pirates, demonstrate that military might 
overcomes terrorism, and concessions only perpetuate it. However, the reason the United 
States was victimized over the payment of tribute was because it no longer had the 
protection of the British navy after the Revolutionary War; furthermore, because the 
United States was a new nation, it did not have the time, money, or resources to pay for a 
navy that could protect its ships. The Barbary pirates exploited this weakness. The pirates 
repeated their actions not because the United States granted concessions, but because the 
United States could not retaliate.  
To stop the cycle of terrorism, the United States needed to enact punishment as a 
deterrent. Negotiations and concessions may be the best tools to save a hostage’s life, but 
the fear of punishment can be an effective tool in preventing and ending terrorist hostage-
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takings. After the United States built a strong navy, it was able to invade the Barbary 
states, demand payment for capturing U.S. ships, and negotiate treaties to prevent future 
attacks.67 It was not military might alone that stopped the pirates; it was the fear of 
reprisal. Historic events such as this one indicate that the answer to stopping hostage-
takings may be found in a policy that focuses on punishing hostage-takers rather than 
preventing concessions.  
C. THE NATION’S POLICY 
Throughout history, the United States has dealt with both domestic and 
international terrorism. During the 1970s, the U.S. policy regarding hostages, according 
to Jenkins et al., “evolved from one in which emphasis was placed on obtaining the safe 
release of the hostage to one in which concessions were rejected and denounced.”68 
While this policy had the benefit of returning hostages quickly and safely, it was 
unpopular because of the fear that it would encourage future hostage-takings.69  
The 1980s saw an increase in attacks against the United States involving Islamic 
terrorists. In 1982, Hezbollah took 30 Western hostages. In 1983, terrorists bombed the 
U.S. Embassy in Lebanon, killing 63 people, of whom 17 were American.70 Also in 
1983, terrorists attacked the U.S. and French embassies, killing six and injuring eight. 
The 1980s would see several more terrorist attacks involving Americans that resulted in 
both military and civilian casualties. It was during this time that President Reagan created 
the Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism to study the issue. The Vice 
President’s Task Force was responsible for completing a review of the “current policies, 
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capabilities, and resources for dealing with the terrorist threat.”71 In 1986, the Task Force 
returned a top-secret document, which is now unclassified, entitled The National 
Program for Combatting Terrorism. According to the report, “The policy is based on the 
conviction that to accede to terrorist demands places more American citizens at risk. This 
no-concessions policy is the best way of protecting the greatest number of people and 
ensuring their safety. At the same time, every available resource will be used to gain the 
safe return of American citizens who are held hostage by terrorists.”72 The policy was 
later refined by the DOS to read, “The United States Government will make no 
concessions to terrorists holding official or private U.S. citizens hostage. It will not pay 
ransom, release prisoners, change its policies, or agree to other acts that might encourage 
additional terrorism. At the same time, the United States will use every appropriate 
resource to gain the safe return of American citizens who are held hostage by 
terrorists.”73 These early policies created the foundational framework for the no-
concessions clause that is still used today.  
The policy has evolved over the years. The DOS Foreign Affairs Manual 
currently reads as follows: “The U.S. Government will make no concessions to 
individuals or groups holding official or private U.S. citizens hostage. The United States 
will use every appropriate resource to gain the safe return of U.S. citizens who are held 
hostage. At the same time, it is U.S. government policy to deny hostage-takers the 
benefits of ransom, prisoner releases, policy changes, or other acts of concessions.”74 It 
bears mentioning that the word terrorist in the policy has been replaced with hostage-
taker. In the introduction to “7 FAM 1821 Hostage-taking and Kidnappings,” the DOS 
defines hostage-taking as terrorism, and kidnapping as criminal. Even though the word 
terrorism is still used, the reduction of its usage seems to be a positive step toward 
lessening the negative stigma associated with negotiating.  
                                                 
71 The White House, The National Program for Combatting Terrorism (NSDD-207) (Washington, 
DC: The White House, 1986), 1. 
72 White House, National Program for Combatting Terrorism, 1. 
73 Bureau of Public Affairs, “Fact Sheet.” 
74 “7 FAM,” U.S. Department of State. 
 19 
The Obama administration ordered a review of the nation’s policy after hearing 
pleas from the families of journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff. Foley and Sotloff 
were held hostage and later beheaded by members of the Islamic State (ISIS). Diane 
Foley, James’ mother, said “that she felt cut off at every avenue by U.S. officials and 
[family members] were threatened with prosecution should they try to pay for her son’s 
return.”75 Because the United States had previously negotiated for the release of Bowe 
Bergdahl, the family wanted clarification about what is and what is not permitted under 
the U.S. government’s no-concessions policy.76 On June 2015, the White House released 
a report detailing changes to the U.S. hostage policy. The report resulted in PPD-30, 
which in part proclaims:  
The United States will use every appropriate resource to gain the safe 
return of U.S. nationals who are held hostage. But the United States 
Government will make no concessions to individuals or groups holding 
U.S. nationals hostage. It is United States policy to deny hostage-takers 
the benefits of ransom, prisoner release, policy changes, or other acts of 
concession. This policy protects U.S. nationals and strengthens national 
security by removing a key incentive for hostage-takers to target U.S. 
nationals, thereby interrupting the vicious cycle of hostage-takings, and by 
helping to deny terrorists and other malicious actors the money, personnel, 
and other resource they need to conduct attacks against the United States, 
its nationals, and it interests. However, this policy does not preclude 
engaging in communications with hostage-takers. For example, when 
appropriate the United States may assist private efforts to communicate 
with hostage-takers, whether directly or through public or private 
intermediaries, and the United States Government may itself communicate 
with hostage-takers, their intermediaries, interested governments, and 
local communities to attempt to secure the safe recovery of the hostage.77 
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This newly formed policy maintains much of the same text that existed in past policies 
but introduces groundbreaking themes such as direct negotiations with terrorists and 
funding no terrorism. The policy is based on an effort to help families of those held 
hostage.  
The U.S. policy on hostage recovery activities has varied slightly over the years, 
but has maintained its no-concessions stipulation. More importantly, the way in which 
presidential administrations have chosen to apply the no-concessions policy has also 
varied. A strict no-concessions policy is often found not viable by the administration that 
implements or upholds it. Before the Obama administration ordered a review of the U.S. 
policy on hostage recovery activities, it firmly upheld the no-concessions policy. After 
the murder of James Foley, Caitlin Hayden, a spokesperson for the National Security 
Council, told reporters that “the United States government, as a matter of long-standing 
policy, does not grant concessions to hostage-takers. Doing so would only put more 
Americans at risk of being taken captive. That is what we convey publicly and what we 
convey privately.”78 Her words contradict the handling of hostage situations by the 
George W. Bush administration. During Bush’s term, the FBI routinely assisted families 
during negotiations with terrorists and even condoned the payment of ransom money 
raised by families. According to an article by Shane Harris, National Security Directive 
12 allowed for the negotiation and ransom payments to terrorists holding U.S. hostages 
under special circumstances.79 While various administrations have enforced the no-
concessions policy differently, the fact remains that each administration since its 
inception has never changed the policy. Moreover, they have all made public comments 
in support of grating no concessions to terrorists. For these reasons, this thesis analyzes 
the policy based on its publicly written words and support.   
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D. RECURRING THEMES OF THE U.S. POLICY 
In analyzing the history of the U.S. negotiating policies, there are four distinctive 
themes that have emerged: 
• Granting no concessions: The United States will “deny hostage-takers 
the benefits of ransom, prisoner release, policy changes, or other acts 
concession.”80 
• Deterring hostage-taking: The U.S. policy of not granting concessions 
will remove incentive and prevent future hostage-taking. 
• Funding no terrorism: The U.S. policy of not granting concessions 
denies “terrorists and other malicious actors the money, personnel, and 
other resource they need to conduct attacks against the United States, its 
nationals, and it interests.”81 
• Using every resource: “The United States will use every appropriate 
resource to gain the safe return of U.S. nationals who are held hostage.”82 
With the exception of funding no terrorism, the themes have been at the heart of U.S. 
policy since its inception. At the center of the policy’s framework is the no-concessions 
rule, and the justifying reasons for granting no concessions can be found in the themes 
deterring hostage-taking and funding terrorism. Because these themes already exist in the 
policy, when conducting the policy options analysis, they help to shape the criteria for 
determining the effectiveness of the three policy options. 
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III. NEGOTIATING WITH TERRORISTS 
To help answer the research question—how does the U.S. no-concessions policy 
impact hostage recovery activities when negotiating with terrorists?—it is important to 
understand the dynamics of negotiating with terrorists. There are many different types of 
terrorists, and much of the literature has different classifications for each. Building on 
other scholars’ definitions, Miller classifies terrorists into four groups: national-
separatists who want independence from governments, revolutionary left-wingers who 
use violence to enact change, reactionaries or right-wingers who prevent or reverse 
societal change, and religious groups that are motivated by theological beliefs.83 Pruitt 
places terrorists into two dimensions within these categories: “(1) More or less 
ideological, in the sense of adhering to an integrated set of abstract beliefs; and (2) More 
or less representative of real constituents, in the sense of speaking for a sizeable set of 
people who acknowledge their leadership.”84  
Zartman and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
classify terrorist groups into two main categories; depending on their motives, they are 
either contingent or absolute terrorists. Contingent terrorists usually take hostages in 
order to negotiate for goods, usually money or comrades.85 Absolute terrorists are usually 
motivated by political reasons: they seek territory, independence, and policy change.86 
Placing terrorists into these two categories does not imply that they must stay in one or 
the other at all times. They often cross between the two categories. Absolute terrorists, 
such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, often take hostages and negotiate ransom payments for their 
release. Somali pirates, as contingent terrorists, fight to protect their territorial fishing 
waters from the illegal dumping of waste and overfishing.  
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Because this thesis primarily focuses on negotiating with terrorists during hostage 
situations, absolute and contingent terrorists are examined. As recent examples have 
shown, it is possible to successfully negotiate with both during a hostage situation.  
A. ABSOLUTE TERRORISTS 
Governments typically respond to absolute terrorists with violence, which 
oftentimes not only fails to decrease terrorism, but increases it instead.87 An example was 
the French response to the National Liberation Front (FLN), in which the French 
deployed its military to stop terrorist violence taking place in Algeria. Early campaigns 
proved successful; however, over time, the violence increased.88 The use of military 
tactics and force also did not prevent the FLN in Algeria from gaining independence from 
France. Other examples of absolute terrorists include the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army (IRA), Hamas, and al-Qaeda. 
The best example of negotiating successfully with an absolute terrorist 
organization took place between the IRA and the British government.89 The conflict 
began when the IRA, which represented the Catholic minority, felt discriminated against 
by the Protestant majority, represented by Britain.90 Through their tactics, the IRA 
became the most notorious nationalist terrorist group in Europe, fighting for 
independence and a united Ireland.91 In its desire for independence, the IRA conducted 
bombings that intentionally targeted civilians.92 However, after 25 years of fighting and 
terrorism and the loss of thousands of lives, negotiations and concessions resulted in 
peace. 
The peace process in Northern Ireland started with the negotiation process. By 
recognizing that the IRA had a legitimate complaint and ultimately conceding to 
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legitimizing its political wing, Sinn Fein, British negotiations helped put an end to 
violence in Northern Ireland. Negotiations gave the IRA a non-violent communications 
option and allowed for moderates within the organization, who were in favor of talks, to 
push the group toward a peaceful resolution. Negotiations did make the IRA a legitimate 
entity, but doing so also encouraged the group to seek legitimacy through political 
means.93 The successful talks between the IRA and British government show that 
negotiating and granting concessions can be an effective counterterrorism tool. Although 
these tools are used during non-hostage situations for absolute terrorists, the principles 
can be applied to contingent terrorists who are holding hostages. 
B. CONTINGENT TERRORISTS 
Those who oppose granting concessions often point to contingent terrorists like 
the Somali pirates as an argument for not negotiating. One report estimates the pirates 
were paid between $339 and $413 million over the course of seven years.94 However, 
ransom payments are not the main factor in encouraging hostage-taking. Somalia has 
been a failed state since civil war broke out over two decades ago. With no real central 
government, there are no real consequences for this type of terrorism. In a Congressional 
Research Service report, Ploch et al. point out that “the increase in pirate attacks off the 
Horn of Africa is directly linked to continuing insecurity and the absence of the rule of 
law in war-torn Somalia.”95 The country remains largely ungoverned, and it lacks the 
capacity to prosecute and imprison pirates.96 While ransoms can provide some incentive, 
this deficiency in government and prosecution are the main causes that perpetuate this 
cycle of terrorism.  
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Ransoms or concessions can provide lifesaving benefits. Many cases of piracy 
have been peacefully resolved through the payment of ransoms. In 2009, a Ukrainian ship 
carrying ammunition, arms, and tanks was seized by Somali pirates.97 The ship and its 
crew were released unharmed after a $3.2 million ransom was paid to the pirates.98 The 
highest known ransom paid to the Somali pirates for the safe release of a ship and crew 
was $9.5 million, for the release of the South Korea oil tanker Samho Dream.99 In these 
cases and many others, paying ransoms has resulted in releasing hostages and saving 
lives and property. Negotiating and paying ransoms do not preclude the United States 
from seeking the arrest and prosecution of suspects or the recovery of money as 
expressed in international law.100 These alternatives are crucial components to ending the 
cycle of hostage-taking.  
C. TACTICAL ACTION AND PAYING RANSOMS  
If ransoms or concessions are not granted, then rescuing the hostage by force is 
one of the only limited options available. This option often results in unnecessary death 
and injury. The United States used force to rescue Captain Richard Phillips of the U.S. 
flagged vessel the Maersk Alabama when Somali pirates seized the ship. Initially, the 
ship’s 20-member crew, all of whom were U.S. citizens, overtook a Somali hijacker in an 
attempt to free Phillips.101 The attempt, however, was unsuccessful; the hijackers loaded 
Phillips into a lifeboat and abandoned the cargo ship.102 In response to the attack, the 
Navy dispatched a destroyer, the U.S.S. Bainbridge. One of the pirates requested medical 
attention and surrendered immediately, leaving three pirates on the lifeboat with Captain 
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Phillips.103 Phillips attempted an escape by jumping into the ocean; however, the pirates 
fired their weapons and were able to recapture him. After days of negotiating, the Navy 
snipers felt that Phillips was in imminent danger when one of the pirates held a gun to 
Phillip’s back. The snipers waited patiently and eventually shot all three hostage-takers at 
the same time, freeing Captain Phillips.104 
It is rare for contingent terrorists to harm hostages; as mentioned by Ploch et al.: 
“Reports suggest that most Somali pirate groups have not wantonly harmed captives 
taken in the course of their raids.”105 This is because, as Zartman explains, “live hostages 
are better bargaining material than dead ones.”106 In the aforementioned hostage 
situation, the pirates would not have likely harmed or killed Captain Phillips; he was a 
needed bargaining chip for the pirates. Furthermore, the pirates understood that Phillips 
served as a shield protecting them from attack. If Phillips were dead, there would be no 
reason for the Navy not to attack and kill them. This was demonstrated during Phillips’ 
attempted escape, when the pirates could have easily shot and killed him. Because they 
needed him alive for protection, and to negotiate for their freedom, however, they chose 
to fire warning shots and recaptured their hostage. 
Examining the Captain Phillips story from a negotiator’s standpoint, the 
negotiations were working—if continued, a peaceful resolution would have followed. 
The foundational principle of hostage negotiations is the concept of “contain and 
negotiate.” Containment can come in the form of actual physical containment, which the 
Navy achieved by tying the pirate’s boat to the Bainbridge. Containment can also be 
verbal, which occurs when verbal negotiators are occupying the hostage-takers’ time. 
During the negotiations with the pirates, the United States was able to achieve both 
physical and verbal containment. Physical containment limits escape options and forces 
negotiations. Verbal containment keeps attention focused on the negotiators, thereby, 
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lessening the probability of hostages being harmed. Obtaining both types of containment 
placed the U.S. negotiators in the best position for success. One of the goals during 
negotiations is to build trust by creating a rapport. The pirates showed that they trusted 
the U.S. negotiators by allowing them to approach their boat. After rapport building, 
behavioral change begins to take place. This was seen when the pirates abandoned the 
demand for ransom and started to only negotiate for their freedom.107 Based on all of 
these factors, and utilizing the most basic principles of negotiations, given enough time, 
the release of Captain Phillips without the loss of any life would have been inevitable. 
According to the FBI’s Hostage Barricade Database System (HOBAS), when negotiators 
utilize the contain-and-negotiate strategy, 95 percent of incidents are resolved without 
loss of life.108 As time passes, defenses subside, fatigue sets in, and the likelihood of a 
peaceful resolution increases.109  
Although Captain Phillips was successfully rescued by use of force, this tactic had 
underlying consequences. Escalating violence against an attacker may cause the attacker 
to reciprocate.110 Vice Admiral Bill Gortney, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central 
Command, conceded that killing the pirates to free Phillips could have caused the pirates 
to become more violent.111 Former FBI Agent Jack Cloonan, who had negotiated with 
Somali pirates previously, expressed a similar concern. In an interview with journalist 
John Goetz, he warned, “We’ve never heard the word ‘revenge’ before and now the 
pirates are vowing revenge.”112 The tactical rescue of Captain Phillips appeared to be 
unnecessary and undoubtedly increased violence against U.S. flagged vessels.   
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Most terrorists want to negotiate because they want to be heard.113 Now that some 
have been killed during the negotiation process, they are less likely to trust the United 
States and more likely to seek revenge for the deaths of their friends. A news article 
following Captain Phillips’ rescue mission reported that pirates along Somalia’s coast 
vowed revenge.114 Journalist Tristan McConnell reports a pirate chief as saying, “The 
American liars have killed our friends after they agreed to free the hostage without 
ransom … this matter will lead to retaliation and we will hunt down particularly 
American citizens traveling our waters.”115 David Gardner reports a Somali pirate leader 
as saying, “From now on, if we capture foreign ships and their respective countries try to 
attack us, we will kill the hostages.”116 Holding true to their threats, Somali pirates fired 
rocket-propelled grenades at the U.S.-flagged Liberty Sun.117 Ploch et al. recall a pirate 
leader’s accounts after the attack on the Liberty Sun: “We were not after a ransom. We 
also assigned a team with special equipment to chase and destroy any ship flying the 
American flag in retaliation for the brutal killing of our friends.”118 This attack illustrates 
how rescuing Captain Phillips by tactical action did not result in decreasing attacks, but 
rather resulted in increasing violence against Americans.  
Rescue missions can be extremely dangerous for hostages. Ploch et al.’s report 
mentions instances in which tactical rescue attempts ended in the hostages’ injury or 
death.119 One of the repercussions of the tactical rescue mission involving Captain 
Phillips was the pirates’ promise that they would kill hostages if they felt threatened. This 
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fear resulted in the deaths of four American hostages aboard the Quest.120 An NBC News 
article reported that the pirates said the American hostages aboard the Quest were killed 
because they were under attack by a U.S. warship: “We ordered our comrades to kill the 
four Americans before they got killed.”121 These events not only show the dangers of 
tactical rescues over negotiations but also show how the Somali pirates are less trusting 
and are now more apt to kill hostages if they feel they are being threatened. The Somali 
pirates’ attack on Liberty Sun and the tragic events aboard Quest show how their tactics 
have changed as a result of aggressive tactical action taken against them. These incidents 
show that granting concessions or ransoms to contingent terrorists saved lives while 
taking tactical action resulted in death or injury.  
Having a strict no-concessions policy limits negotiations and narrows options to 
tactical actions such as hostage rescue. These missions are the riskiest endeavors to 
undertake during hostage recovery activities. More hostages die from the attempted 
tactical rescue operation than from execution by terrorists.122 One of the most recent 
incidents involved the failed rescue attempt of Luke Somers and South African aid 
worker Pierre Korkie, who were being held by ISIS militants. The first rescue attempt 
was unsuccessful and resulted in one of the rescuers being shot. The second rescue 
attempt also failed and resulted in the deaths of Somers and Korkie. According to Karen 
DeYoung, Korkie’s family had just negotiated for his safe release when both Somers and 
Korkie were killed by their captors during the raid.123 This case is further evidence that 
negotiations are a more viable option than tactical rescue.  
Two of the most noted failed hostage rescue missions took place during the 1972 
Munich Olympics massacre and the 2002 Moscow theater hostage crisis. During the 1972 
Olympics, eight Palestinian terrorists took 11 Israelis hostage. The terrorists thought they 
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were being allowed to escape on an airplane when German police attempted to rescue the 
hostages. The attempt was a failure that resulted in the deaths of all the Israelis and five 
of the terrorists. The 2002 Moscow theater hostage situation was the result of Chechen 
terrorists seizing and barricading themselves in the Nord-Ost Theater with approximately 
850 hostages. After two days, Russian forces pumped a chemical gas into the theater, 
then assaulted the building. The rescue mission resulted in the deaths of 129 hostages and 
39 terrorists. Tactical rescue missions are high risk and can carry the unintended 
consequences of death and injury. While these missions are sometimes necessary, they 
should only be utilized after negotiations and all other alternatives fail.  
Negotiating with absolute terrorists—such as ISIS—who are holding hostages has 
saved lives. While it cannot be claimed that negotiating would have emphatically saved 
Foley and Sotloff, refusal to negotiate did nothing to return them to safety. Foley and 
Sotloff were two of 23 hostages from 12 countries being held prisoner in Syria. The 
United States has a strict policy against granting concessions to terrorists; other countries 
such as France, Italy, and Spain have a history of successfully negotiating and paying 
ransoms for the release of their citizens.124 An article in the New York Times by Rukmini 
Callimachi reported that the ISIS members who had been holding the 23 hostages sent 
ransom demands to all of the hostages’ families.125 As time passed, other European 
hostages were repeatedly invited outside of their cells to answer proof-of-life questions; 
however, the Americans and the Britains were not.126 According to the article, it did not 
take long to realize which nations were most likely to pay ransoms, as the Spanish 
prisoners were released first, followed by the French and later the Italians. Of the 23 
original prisoners, eventually only seven remained, all American and British citizens.127 
Callimachi references an article published by ISIS’ magazine, Dabiq, that cites U.S. 
airstrikes as the justification for killing James Foley; however, the magazine also blames 
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the U.S. no-concessions policy for Foley’s death.128 The Dabiq claims, “As the American 
government was dragging its feet, reluctant to save James’s life … negotiations were 
made by the governments of a number of European prisoners, which resulted in the 
release of a dozen of [ISIS’] prisoners.”129 As indicated by this article, ransom payments 
resulted in safe return of many of the hostages. ISIS was willing to negotiate for the 
release of U.S. hostages, but because the United States stood by its no-concessions 
policy, it resulted in Foley’s death instead of his freedom.     
One of the principle reasons for not paying ransoms is that doing so might set a 
precedent that encourages future hostage-taking and perpetuates this cycle of terrorism. 
David Cohen has argued this to be the case and points to evidence that countries that do 
pay ransoms have higher incidents of hostage-taking among their citizens; however, his 
statements are contrary to the statistical evidence found in the GTD, which shows the 
United States, despite its no-concessions, policy has the highest prevalence of citizens 
taken hostage when compared to the countries that are accused of paying ransoms.130 
Cohen’s statements also conflict with empirical research. Peter Phillips and Gabrela Pohl 
conducted research based on the theoretical advances in economics designed to reveal if 
paying concessions makes terrorists more risk-seeking and likely to repeat their 
tactics.131 They argue that conventional wisdom leads people to believe that concessions 
make terrorists repeat acts of terrorism; however, their research results imply that 
granting concessions to terrorists will not increase their pursuit to undertake riskier action 
for a higher payoff.132 Moreover, they reveal that “when less risk-averse terrorists do 
engage in such actions and when they are successful at it, the government may use 
positively valued concessions to alleviate that crisis without making terrorists more risk 
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seeking.”133 This research reiterates the point that paying ransoms can bring resolution to 
hostage situations without causing terrorists to repeat their actions.  
The moral question during a hostage situation is: How much is a life worth? Other 
countries have taken an active role in negotiating and paying ransoms, which has resulted 
in saving their citizens’ lives. Cases in which the United States and Great Britain refused 
to grant concessions have resulted in the deaths of their citizens. The policy failed to 
protect them or others from being taken hostage, and it most certainly failed to save their 
lives. When dealing with the two types of terrorists, granting concessions, such as 
ransoms, can save lives. Proponents of the no-concessions policy, like David Cohen, 
argue that tactical rescues are a far better option for saving lives than paying ransoms. 
Much research, however, counters his argument. A RAND study by Bass-Golod et al. 
found that tactical action resulted in 79 percent of the hostages being killed during the 
rescue operation.134 Historical data according to HOBAS also show that tactical assaults 
result in a 78 percent injury or death rate.135 Because of the high risk of injury or death, 
tactical action should not be the primary response to hostage situations.  
D. ENDING THE CYCLE OF TERRORISM 
One of the justifications for the no-concessions policy is that it is designed to end 
the cycle of terrorist hostage-takings. However, research thus far has indicated that it has 
failed to achieve this objective. The surest way to prevent terrorists from taking hostages 
is to end the existence of terrorist groups. Bass-Golod et al. claim that all terrorist groups 
will eventually cease to exist.136 Answering how and why can give insight to the 
formation of a hostage recovery policy that will be able to safeguard U.S. citizens from 
hostage-takings.  
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According to one study, terrorist groups often end because of group dynamics 
over time. Cronin explains, “The historical record indicates that terrorist campaigns end 
most often when a group implodes because of failure to pass the cause on to another 
generation, loss of popular support, infighting and factionalisation, failure of operational 
control, marginalization from their constituencies, and targeting errors that engender a 
backlash.”137 A study by Jones and Libicki indicates that, 83 percent of the time, groups 
end as a result of joining the political process and of action taken by domestic law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies.138 This study indicates that using police and 
intelligence agencies may be a good approach for dealing with hostage-taking incidents. 
Because local police forces have a permanent presence and are part of the community, 
they have a better understanding of terrorists and are therefore more likely to bring about 
a terrorist group’s demise.139 The authors also point to the fact that police “have better 
training and information to penetrate and disrupt terrorist organizations.”140 Utilizing 
these resources allows for a hostage-recovery policy that can truly achieve deterrence. 
The chart in Figure 1 contrasts the effectiveness of using police against the 
ineffectiveness of using military force alone to end terrorism. 
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Figure 1.  How Terrorism Ends 
 
Adapted from Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al 
Qa’ida (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/
RAND_MG741-1.pdf. 
Military tactics’ inability to stop the cycle of hostage-taking was illustrated in 
Somalia. The Somali pirates cannot be deterred from terrorism by ransom refusals or 
military might alone. Even though over a dozen foreign governments have deployed 
warships to the region, ships are still being hijacked.141 Many experts believe that to 
effectively stop piracy, the country of Somalia needs to be fixed. As Ploch et al. state, 
“By all accounts, pirates will likely continue to find sanctuary in Somalia until basic 
governance and security conditions improve.”142 In addition, the prosecution of terrorists 
“is considered by many to be a critical step” toward making piracy less attractive and 
ending this cycle of terrorism.143 
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Fear of prosecution and retribution seem to be successful deterrents to hostage-
taking; research shows how effective the police and intelligence agencies can be at 
ending terrorism. The U.S. policy should focus less on the no-concessions rule and more 
on bringing hostage-takers to justice. As the RAND study by Bass-Golod et al. 
concluded, “The strongest deterrent seems to be a government’s demonstrated will and 
ability to capture and kill terrorists and destroy their organizations.”144 This 
counterterrorism strategy has been proven to effectively end the cycle of hostage-taking. 
Bringing terrorists to justice by implementing a policy to pursue, capture, or kill has the 
potential to stop the cycle of terrorism more effectively than refusing to pay ransoms. 
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IV. POLICY OPTIONS ANALYSIS 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the United States’ terrorist negotiation policy, the 
next steps were as follows: construct alternatives, establish criteria, and evaluate policy 
options. Once the alternatives were developed, they were measured against the 
established criteria. Thereafter, they were scored using a prescribed scale. The outcome is 
a recommendation for the most effective option.  
A. CONSTRUCT ALTERNATIVES 
A total of three policy options were developed: the current policy, a policy that 
freely grants ransom payments or other acts of concessions, and a policy that removes the 
no-concessions language.  
(1) Option A: No Concessions 
The first policy option, no concessions, means keeping the no-concessions rule in 
place. This option is included to allow for a complete understanding of the existing 
policy, which is a necessary element in policy analysis. Furthermore, it is useful for 
decision makers to see how the no-concessions policy compares with other alternatives so 
a more informed, unbiased decision can be made for proper policy selection.   
(2) Option B: Capitulation or Safe-release  
The second policy option is a capitulation, or safe-release, policy wherein the 
United States pays ransoms, conducts prisoner releases, and offers concessions to ensure 
the highest likelihood of a hostage’s save return. As Bass-Golod et al. explain, “A policy 
of safe release tries to obtain quick return of hostages by meeting the kidnappers’ 
demands, which typically include release of prisoners, monetary ransom, and publication 
or broadcast of manifestos.”145 This policy has a humanitarian image, but nations have 
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become reluctant to grant such extensive concessions to terrorists out of fear of increased 
attacks.146  
(3) Option C: Removal of No-Concessions Language 
The last policy option is to remove the no-concessions rule; this policy does not 
give hostages’ families the ability to pay ransoms. It is important to distinguish that 
removing the no-concessions language does not mean all the terrorists’ requests will be 
granted during negotiations; this policy option should not be confused with the 
capitulation policy. Option C closely resembles the typical methods followed by 
American police when dealing with hostage situations. The American policing model 
relies on options to materialize from the fruits of the negotiation process.  
The practical principles used today in hostage negotiations were developed by 
Harvey Schlosberg and Frank Bolz of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) in 
1972.147 The NYPD was the first law enforcement hostage negotiation unit in the world. 
Their hostage negotiation principles were developed after the failed rescue attempt of the 
Israeli Olympic team in Munich, which resulted in the deaths of all hostage Israeli 
athletes and a German police officer at hands of Palestinian terrorists. Events like this, in 
which victims and police were killed or injured, shaped the concept of “contain and 
negotiate.”148 Even though the American policing model was developed to cope with 
terrorist hostage-taking events, police rarely negotiate with terrorists. However, the 
methods and principles utilized are universal in dealing with hostage situations. For the 
technique to be effective there can be no restrictions on the negotiation process, as 
negotiations require trust, patience, and leverage to be successful.  
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B. ESTABLISH CRITERIA 
When analyzing how the nation’s policy on negotiating with terrorists developed, 
recurring themes and goals emerged from the different policies over time. From the 
recurring themes, four criteria were developed to determine the effectiveness of each 
policy option; the criteria measure the degree to which the options 1) fund no terrorism, 
2) deter hostage-taking, 3) use every resource, and 4) apply consistency and equality. 
Because these themes are goal oriented and already exist in the policy, they are practical 
indicators for determining an effective policy. The last criterion, applying consistency 
and equality, was developed as a result of analyzing historical happenings of the U.S. 
policy as it was applied.   
(1) Funding No Terrorism 
This criterion was one of the new frames that emerged from the analysis of the 
nation’s policy. Funding terrorism is a concern because money is used by terrorists to buy 
weapons and conduct attacks against the United States. For this reason, anti-terrorism 
policies should be made to prevent, limit, or recover such funding. While the research 
does show that ransoms do little to fund major global terrorist organizations like ISIS and 
Al-Qaeda, this criterion is an important consideration for smaller terrorist groups. This 
measurement is a justifying reason for the no-concessions rule, and an effective policy 
should be designed to address all concerns in preventing terrorism.  
(2) Deterring Hostage-taking 
Deterring hostage-taking and ending the cycle of violence and terrorism has been 
at the forefront of the nation’s policy since its inception. The purpose of the policy is to 
protect U.S. nationals from being taken hostage. Because it is the defining justification 
for the current policy, it is important to use it as a measure of effectiveness. 
(3) Using Every Resource 
Is every resource available being used to bring American citizens home? A policy 
that limits the use of every resource is detrimental to the effective recovery of U.S. 
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nationals being held hostage. Resources can include the ability to conduct effective 
negotiations or grant minor concessions in order to secure the safe release of hostages.  
While negotiating does not necessarily mean granting concessions, the United 
States and other countries have successfully used prisoner exchanges to free hostages. 
Negotiation is an empathetic understanding of another’s feelings and problems. Empathy 
should not be confused with agreement. By negotiating with terrorists, we accept only 
that their concerns and not their methods are legitimate. This opens communications, 
which allows negotiators to build a rapport and affect behavioral change by exerting 
influence. Negotiating does not simply mean making deals, concessions, and 
compromises.149 It is an important counterterrorism tool that allows for intelligence 
gathering and quicker conflict resolution.  
(4) Applying Consistency and Equality 
Policies should be designed in a way that allows them to be consistently followed. 
If the policy is applied inconsistently, there is no way to determine its true effectiveness. 
Moreover, a policy that cannot be applied consistently may be inherently flawed. Having 
consistency furthermore helps maintain the significance of the message.  
In addition to consistency, an effective policy should allow for equality; it should 
be enacted equally to all hostages who are taken abroad. Every hostage should be granted 
the same resources during the recovery process. The current policy is criticized for its 
contradictory application between Bowe Bergdahl’s negotiation, and those of James 
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C. EVALUATE POLICY OPTIONS 
Each policy’s potential effectiveness was evaluated against the criteria using the 
construct in Table 1. 
Table 1.   Policy Evaluation Template 





Criteria    
Funding No Terrorism    
Deterring Hostage-taking    
Using Every Resource    
Applying Consistency & 
Equality    
    
Score Total    
 
The three policy options are listed at the top of the table, and the five criteria are 
listed to the left. Each policy alternative was assigned a scoring unit of measure ranging 
from -1 to 1. The policy option scored a -1 for a given criterion if it did not meet the 
criterion’s objective, a 0 if the objective could not be determined, and a 1 if the policy 
option met the criterion. Once the policy options were scored, they were calculated and 
ranked. The highest number indicated the most effective policy while the lowest number 
indicated the least effective policy. The result yielded the recommended policy option for 
the United States to consider for terrorist hostage-takings.  
1. Option A: No Concessions  
The current policy stresses a no-concessions rule while allowing for direct 
negotiations between terrorists and families, who have the ability to pay ransoms to 
secure the safe return of their family members. While this policy does make great strides 
by allowing negotiations, retaining the no-concessions rule and openly allowing families 
to pay ransoms may hinder negotiations. In addressing these concerns, three questions 
need to be answered. First, does having a no-concessions policy deter hostage-taking? 
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Second, does paying ransoms really fund terrorism? And third, does the policy allow for 
consistency and equality?  
a. Does the No-Concessions Policy Deter Hostage-taking? 
Throughout the history of the U.S. policy on negotiating with terrorists, refusing 
to give into terrorists’ demands and granting concessions has been at the foundation. 
Behavioral logic, based on a system of performance and rewards, lends credence to the 
belief that removing incentives deters hostage-taking and ends the cycle of terrorism. 
Although this has been a long-standing U.S. policy, hostage-takings are still happening. 
A RAND study conducted in 1977 by Jenkins et al. contains evidence that a no-
concessions policy is ineffective at deterring hostage-taking.150 From 1968 to 1975, 
Jenkins et al. examined 77 hostage incidents and found “there were cases in which 
governments refused to negotiate concessions and yet there were future kidnappings; and 
there are contrary cases in which government concessions were not followed by future 
kidnappings.”151 The latter is exemplified by the Brazilian government, which regularly 
granted concessions to terrorists in exchange for their citizens. Despite these concessions, 
Brazil’s anti-terrorism campaign was able to apprehend or kill many of the terrorist 
group’s members, and the hostage-taking incidents ended as abruptly as they began.152 In 
contrast to Brazil, countries that shifted from a concessions policy to a firm no-
concessions policy still experienced a pattern of hostage-takings.153 Moreover, countries 
such as Argentina, Israel, and Uruguay, which have always refused to grant concessions, 
continue to fall victim to terrorist kidnappings.154 The evidence from this study indicates 
that a no-concessions policy does nothing to protect people from hostage-taking. 
However, the study did determine that the most effective deterrence factor was “the 
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capacity of the local security forces to destroy the organization and apprehend its 
members.”155   
Several other studies by economists also indicate a no-concessions policy does 
not protect American citizens from being taken hostage. Lapan and Sandler used 
economic equations and analysis in a simple game-theory framework to prove that having 
a no-negotiations strategy does not work.156 As they explained, “The conventional 
wisdom regarding the no-negotiation strategy does not withstand theoretical scrutiny 
except in a limited number of contrived cases.”157 Lapan and Sandler’s work illustrates 
that a no-concessions policy may be insufficient to deter an attack if other benefits, such 
as publicity, can be gained.158 They do note that strictly enforced no-concessions 
policy—one that is never violated—would deter attacks if the terrorists were motivated 
solely by concessions.159 Because the United States has continually violated its policy, 
and because no terrorists are solely motivated by concessions, it is highly unreasonable to 
believe that a firm no-concessions policy will work in the United States.  
Economics professors Muhammad Islam and Wassim Shahin used economic 
methodology to examine what effects the Iran-Contra affair had on political hostage-
taking in the Middle East.160 Their research shows that the past U.S. policy was not only 
against negotiating and granting concessions, but also sought to not actively pursue and 
punish terrorists who participated in hostage-taking.161 They assume in their research, as 
others have, that hostages have the value of publicity. Therefore, videotaped hostages 
shown by the media and publicly open negotiations provide benefits for hostage-
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takers.162 In the end, Islam and Shahin’s research bears the same results as Lapan and 
Sandler’s: a no-concessions policy will not work to deter hostage-taking. They concede 
that the policy could work in the complete absence of media coverage, and if the 
terrorists have a strong perceived threat of punitive action from the United States.163 
With the advent of social media, it is impossible to comprehend a world in which 
terrorists will receive no publicity from hostage-taking. Moreover, terrorist groups such 
as ISIS, which has formed its own self-proclaimed state, have made it almost impossible 
to enforce strong punitive action.   
In addition to economic models, quantitative research from the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) was explored. This research comes from the National Consortium for 
the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START)’s database at the University 
of Maryland. START researched and documented terrorist-related events from news 
sources in order create the GTD. According to the organization’s website, START has 
been compiling terrorist attack data since 1970.164 The GTD provides historical data on 
the number of hostages taken, and is one of the most comprehensive terrorism databases 
that exists today. Analyzing this information yielded the graph in Figure 2 and provided 
insight into the ineffectiveness of a no-concessions policy.165 
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Figure 2.  Hostage-Taking Incidents over Time 
 
Data derived from the Global Terrorism Database. See https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/History.aspx. 
This data was gathered using specific search criteria established by the GTD 
between the years 1970 and 2014. Incidents were only included if there was no doubt of 
terrorism, the attacks were successful, and the attacks encompassed only hostage-taking 
incidents. The results indicate that hostage-taking has been on the rise, increasing over 
time; furthermore, the figure shows a dramatic spike in hostage-taking from 2012 to 
2014. Because most countries claim to have a no-concessions policy, Figure 2 illustrates 
that people are still being taken hostage at increasing rates despite this policy. 
It has been claimed that only the United States and Great Britain stand by their 
no-concessions policies, and other European countries, such as Italy, Spain, France, and 
Germany, secretly pay concessions, thereby putting their citizens at risk for increased 
hostage-taking. Information from the GTD dataset (which included only citizens from 
these countries who were taken hostage by terrorists) indicated that the United States has 
the highest incidents of hostage-taking, even with a strict no-concessions policy in place 
(see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3.  Hostage-Takings by Country 
 
Data derived from the Global Terrorism Database. See https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/History.aspx. 
The no-concessions policy is designed to deny hostage-takers the rewards they 
request, such as ransom payments and prisoner exchanges. The research has shown that 
denying concessions does not prevent hostage-taking. One of the reasons discussed was 
that hostages have the value of publicity. Even when terrorists’ demands are not met, they 
are able to derive this benefit. For example, video recordings of hostages being beheaded 
or otherwise brutally executed have a very high chance of achieving global notoriety, 
which gives hostages value outside of monetary considerations. The onset of any hostage 
situation quickly becomes real-time global news. This was evident during the 2015 Paris 
terrorist attacks and hostage situation at the Bataclan Theatre that resulted in the death of 
89 hostages.166 Many people witnessed the police raid on the theatre by means of 
instantaneous streaming media from cell phones.  
According to a report by the Human Rights Council, which interviewed over 300 
Syrians, ISIS publicizes its brutality and beheadings to convey its authority over its areas 
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of control, to show its strength, and to attract recruits.167 The influential messages that 
are publicized by the media serve to build ISIS’ brand. By using the media, ISIS builds 
and reinforces the fact that it is the leader in the global jihadist movement. Media outlets 
that routinely conduct stories on ISIS’ ruthlessness advertise for them by allowing them 
to demonstrate their power. Knowingly or not, the media plays an important role in 
helping ISIS recruit more terrorists and raise money, allowing them to continue their 
campaigns. Because of this, hostages, especially Western ones, will continue to be 
valuable to terrorist groups.  
For terrorists, there is always a value in obtaining hostages; a no-ransom policy 
does not diminish that value. Since the inception of the U.S. no-concessions policy, there 
has been no drop in the frequency of hostage-takings of American citizens. Having a no-
concessions policy potentially endangers hostages by reducing the flexibility in the 
negotiations process. This can ultimately limit negotiators’ ability to effectively bring 
American citizens home safely. Moreover, the research found no evidence that a no-
concessions policy prevents future hostage-takings. These findings question the necessity 
of keeping the no-concessions clause in the U.S. policy.  
b. Does Paying Ransoms Really Fund Terrorism? 
The newest justification for having a no-concessions policy is that granting 
ransoms funds terrorism. This discourse was reinforced in PPD-30, which explains that 
prohibiting ransom payments denies “terrorists and other malicious actors the money, 
personnel, and other resources they need to conduct attacks against the United States, its 
nationals, and its interests.”168 Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence 
David Cohen reinforces this, claiming, “Kidnapping for ransom is one of the most 
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significant terrorist financing threats today.”169 While terrorists do receive some money 
through kidnappings, it is far from their greatest or most significant source of revenue. 
According to Patrick Johnston of RAND, ISIS is funded primarily through oil sales, 
antique looting, donations, and internal extortion and taxation.170 Johnston confirms that 
RAND has been researching the ISIS finances since 2011 based on seized ISIS payroll 
documents, memos, and ledgers. Nowhere in his report does Johnston list ransom 
payments as a primary funding source. Revenue from ransoms likely pales in comparison 
to ISIS’ overall revenue. 
In a New York Times article, Rukmini Callimachi claims that terror organizations 
receive about $20.8 million a year in ransom payments.171 David Cohen reinforces this 
estimate by stating in a 2014 speech that “ISIL has taken at least $20 million in ransoms 
this year.”172 Several sources cite ISIS’ annual oil revenue alone at $365 million to $1 
billion.173 When ISIS’ oil sales are added to its revenue generated from taxes/extortion, 
agriculture, looting, and donations, their estimated yearly income is $2 billion.174 In 
context, ransoms make up approximately one percent of ISIS’ average annual income. 
After taking this into consideration, money from ransoms is inconsequential to the overall 
funding of terrorism. 
The Report on U.S. Hostage Policy indicates that the government allows families 
to negotiate with terrorists, and it indirectly states that they can pay ransoms.175 The 
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report declares that the U.S. government will ensure families are not defrauded by 
terrorists; “The U.S. Department of Justice does not intend to add to families’ pain in 
such cases by suggesting that they could face criminal prosecution … [by providing] 
material support to designated foreign terrorist organizations.”176 This allows families the 
ability to pay ransoms with the implicit support of the U.S. government. While ransoms 
only make up a small part of the terrorist funding source, a policy that condones ransom 
payments contradicts the no-concessions language and sanctions the funding of terrorism. 
It is without question that any money given to a terrorist organization helps fund 
that organization; however, the research shows that the impact of ransom payments in the 
overall income of a terrorist organization is greatly exaggerated. When comparing the 
overall budgets of terrorist organizations like ISIS, eliminating ransoms does nothing to 
prevent them from obtaining more members, acquiring additional resources, or 
conducting attacks against the United States or its citizens—key justifications for the no-
concessions policy.  
c. Policy in Practice: Has a History of Negotiating Allowed for Consistency 
and Equality? 
In his book Negotiating with Evil: When to Talk to Terrorists, Mitchell Reiss 
reveals that the United States has negotiated with terrorists. Reiss writes, “American 
Presidents have negotiated with terrorists and rogue regimes to secure the release of 
hostages, to arrange temporary cease-fires and to explore whether a more permanent 
truce might be possible.”177 Reiss’ book covers many high-profile incidents involving 
hostage-takings. One incident involved the hijackings of airplanes belonging to Pan Am 
and Swissair, which were seized by the Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine. 
During the hostage siege, the United States encouraged Israel, Switzerland, West 
Germany, and Britain to release Palestinian prisoners in their jails so the terrorists would 
free the hostages on the two hijacked airliners.178 In another incident, Jimmy Carter spent 
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the last year of his presidency negotiating with Iran for the release of American diplomats 
who had been taken hostage, finally agreeing to return $8 billion in frozen Iranian 
assets.179 Researching and discussing cases like these helps determine the consistency 
and equality of the application of the U.S. hostage negotiation policy.    
(1) The Iran-Contra Affair 
One of the best-known cases of granting concessions to terrorists was during the 
Iran-Contra affair. Iran, which was at war with Iraq, brokered a deal with the United 
States to buy arms. According to excerpts from the Tower Commission Report, the 
United States did in fact negotiate a deal to sell arms in exchange for hostages.180 This 
arms-for-hostages proposal directly countered U.S. policies; according to the report, “The 
United States had announced a policy of neutrality in the six-year-old Iran–Iraq war and 
had proclaimed an embargo on arms sales to Iran. It had worked actively to isolate Iran 
and other regimes known to give aid and comfort to terrorists. It had declared that it 
would not pay ransom to hostage-takers.”181 By negotiating and exchanging weapons for 
hostages, the United States violated all three of these proclaimed policies. President 
Reagan and many others would later deny that selling arms to Iran was an arms-for-
hostages deal; however, excerpts from the Tower Commission Report indicate 
otherwise.182 The report details a complex plan to sell and deliver tube-launched, 
optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missiles to Iran in exchange for seven U.S. 
hostages being held by the terrorist group Hezbollah.183  
Between August and September of 1985, 508 TOW missiles were delivered to 
Iran in exchange for one hostage.184 In an attempt to free the remaining hostages, direct 
negotiations with the Iranians took place in Frankfurt, Germany. These negotiations were 
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conducted by Oliver North. During the negotiations, North agreed to persuade Kuwait to 
release 17 convicted terrorists being held in Kuwaiti prisons.185 These terrorists were 
members of Al Da’Wa, a Shiite group, who were responsible for bombing attacks on 
American and French embassies that killed four people and injured many others.186 The 
negotiations involving the release of the Da’Wa terrorists were in direct conflict with the 
United States’ support of Kuwait in resisting terrorist demands to releases prisoners.187 It 
also violated the U.S. policy against grating prisoner releases to terrorists.  
The operations, plans, and direct negotiations that were presented throughout the 
Tower Commission Report clearly indicate that the United States was negotiating with 
Iran for the release of hostages. During these negotiations, it was clear that the United 
States was willing to grant a number of concessions in exchange for the hostages. What 
made the Iran-Contra affair even more egregious, as divulged by the report, is that, “The 
Regan Administration … had come into office declaring a firm stand against terrorism … 
[and] a major study under the chairmanship of the Vice President resulted in a vigorous 
reaffirmation of U.S. opposition to terrorism in all its forms and a vow of total war on 
terrorism whatever its source.”188 When the United States has inconsistent policies, and 
when it violates those policies, future policy statements are difficult to trust.189  
(2) Prisoner Exchanges  
Another example of the United States violating its no-concession policy was the 
release of U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl from Taliban captivity in exchange for 
five Taliban detainees who were being held at the U.S. prison camp in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba.190 Bergdahl, who was stationed in Afghanistan, left his outpost without telling 
anyone. He was captured by the Taliban and held prisoner for five years while the United 
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States negotiated his release. In several news articles, the White House describes the 
event as a prisoner exchange, and in no way a violation of U.S. policy against granting 
concessions to terrorists; however, White House National Security Council spokesperson 
Caitlin Hayden admitted that the Taliban was added to the list of Specially Designated 
Global Terrorists by executive order in 2002, thereby making them a terrorist group.191 
Furthermore, according to a 2008 Pentagon dossier on inmates at Guantanamo Bay, the 
five Taliban detainees released were likely to commit attacks against the United States if 
liberated.192 The release of these high-risk detainees and the Taliban’s designation as a 
terrorist group indicates that the United States did, in fact, violate its policy. 
A lesser-known hostage exchange, though not involving a U.S. military prisoner 
or citizen, occurred in Iraq in 2010 when British civilian Peter Moore was kidnapped by 
the terrorist group known as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH).193 Moore, an information 
technology (IT) consultant, was working for an American IT company in Baghdad. He 
was setting up a data system at the Ministry of Finance when he and his four bodyguards, 
who were also British citizens, were kidnapped.194 While in captivity, Moore’s four 
bodyguards were killed by AAH. AAH has conducted thousands of bombings against the 
United States and Iraqi forces, targeted kidnappings of Westerners, conducted rocket and 
mortar attacks on the U.S. Embassy, murdered American soldiers, and assassinated Iraqi 
officials.195 The leader of AAH, Qais al-Khazali, and his brother, Laith al-Khazali, were 
captured by American and coalition forces in Basra. Qais al-Khazali is accused of being 
one of the masterminds responsible for an ambush attack in Karbala in which five U.S. 
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soldiers were killed.196 According to an American military spokesman, the brothers and a 
22-page document on the Karbala attack were seized. The seized document revealed the 
detailed surveillance that the terrorist group conducted on the American soldiers prior to 
the attack.197  
The chief negotiator for the Iraqi government, Sami al-Askari, said that the 
exchange of the Kahzali brothers for the British hostages had been under discussion for 
months.198 Because the Iraqi, U.S., and British governments’ policy is not to exchange 
hostages for prisoners, negotiating is a delicate issue.199 The governments could not 
“participate in the political process,” al-Askari said, “while they are holding hostages. 
And we mentioned to the American side that they cannot join in the political process and 
release their hostages while their leaders are behind bars or imprisoned.”200 The deal was 
eventually made, and both Khazali brothers were traded for Peter Moore, who was the 
only surviving hostage. Hundreds more AAH members were freed in exchange for the 
bodies of the murdered hostages.201 In this case, the United States clearly released 
terrorists back to their group in exchange for a British civilian. This prisoner exchange 
was a direct violation of the U.S. no-concessions policy.  
In a USA Today article, Bruce Hoffman, director of Georgetown University’s 
Center for Security Studies, agrees with Mitchell Reiss: “We have long negotiated with 
terrorists. Virtually every other country in the world has negotiated with terrorists despite 
pledges never to.”202 Hoffman goes on to list many of the same high-profile cases that 
Reiss mentions in his book. History demonstrates that the United States has clearly 
contradicted its policy against granting concessions to terrorists. It is this contradiction 
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that leads to confusion and limits the United States’ ability to effectively use negotiations 
in conflict resolution. As Neumann concludes, “When it comes to negotiating with 
terrorists, there is a clear disconnect between what governments profess and what they 
actually do. But the rigidity of the ‘no negotiations’ stance that has prevented any 
systematic exploration of how to best conduct negotiations.”203 
Past policy violations cause confusion and mistrust not only with other 
governments, but also with U.S. citizens. It also introduces unnecessary scrutiny of the 
policy and, as seen in the Bowe Bergdahl prisoner exchange, it questions the policy’s 
equitability. Many questioned why the United States negotiated a prisoner release for 
Bowe Bergdahl but did nothing for James Foley. The new U.S. policy was an attempt to 
address these inequities, but maintaining a no-concessions policy appears to hinder any 
efforts for equality. History has demonstrated that a no-concessions policy will continue 
to be violated and, as such, equality will remain intangible.  
d. Evaluation 
In measuring the current policy’s effectiveness, the United States has failed to 
meet any of the criteria. These failures are mostly due to the rigid no-concessions rule. 
Having this rule in the policy limits the flexibility needed to conduct negotiations. It 
reduces options and limits outcomes. If negotiators are not allowed to discuss the 
possibility of ransom payments, prisoner releases, or other acts of concessions, 
negotiations can be one-sided and ineffective.  
The strict guidelines also open the policy to violations. History has proven that the 
United States and other countries are apt to violate firm no-concessions policies. Whether 
it is Israel’s release of over 1,000 prisoners for one citizen, or the United States’ and the 
United Kingdom’s prisoner exchanges involving Bowe Bergdahl and Peter Moore, this 
type of policy will continue to be violated. Every hostage situation is different, and 
having a blanket policy, especially one that is restricting, does not allow for the safe 
return of hostages. In addition, rigid policies that cannot be upheld make the countries 
appear weak. A no-concessions policy sounds strong, but when nations are forced to 
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violate their own policies, they lose credibility. When Ronald Reagan made the pledge, 
“We do not negotiate with terrorists,” it sent a message that the nation was unyielding to 
terrorists; when this statement was violated, it showed weakness, defeat, and 
untrustworthiness.204  
A policy that bans prisoner releases also prevents the use of every resource 
available to save hostages. Prisoner exchanges can be valuable leverage during 
negotiations, as proven by past events, including the recent nuclear talks with Iran. 
Negotiators in the United States and Iran were able to parlay a successful prisoner 
exchange, resulting in Iran’s release of five detained American citizens in exchange for 
seven Iranian prisoners being held by the United States.205 The current U.S. policy still 
prohibits such exchanges despite their effectiveness as a negotiation strategy.  
One of the major premises in justifying the no-concessions policy is that paying 
ransom money funds terrorism. As previously discussed, although technically a form of 
funding, the degree to which ransom payments contribute to a terrorist organization’s 
overall income is nominal. The current policy is designed to allow families the ability to 
pay ransoms. Openly allowing families to pay ransoms not only contradicts the no-
concessions message, but also contradicts the policy’s goal to not fund terrorism.  
Another core reason for justifying the policy is that it deters hostage-taking. This 
thesis has proved with empirical evidence that having a no-concessions policy does not 
deter hostage-taking. The research has shown that hostages have value other than 
monetary gains. Paying or refusing to grant concessions will not prevent hostage-taking. 
Moreover, a no-concessions policy by itself will not stop the cycle of terrorism. Multiple 
policies that use a combination of conciliatory practices with harsh punishments will 
work to stop hostage-taking; however, because the U.S. global reach is limited, as 
claimed in PPD-30, it is almost impossible to maintain an effective counter-terrorism 
strategy that can enact harsh punishment.206  
                                                 
204 “Excerpts from the Tower Commission’s Report,” American Presidency Project, 15. 
205 Bradley Klapper and Matthew Lee, “Triumph or Travesty, US-Iran Ties Warming over Nuclear 
Deal,” Washington Post, January 16, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/. 
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Based on this research and the scoring method previously described, option A 
received a total score of -4 (see Table 2), failing to meet any of the criteria.  
Table 2.   Policy Option A Evaluation 
 Policy Option A No Concessions 
Criterion  
Funding No Terrorism -1 
Deterring Hostage-taking -1 
Using Every Resource -1 
Applying Consistency & Equality -1 
  
Score Total -4 
 
• Funding No Terrorism: Option A received a -1 score for the funding no 
terrorism criterion. The policy declares that it will not pay ransoms to 
terrorists, but allows families with government assistance to pay ransoms. 
Regardless of who pays, the policy allows for the payment of ransoms; as 
such, it failed to meet the criterion.   
• Deterring Hostage-taking: According to the research, option A does not 
deter hostage-taking; it received a score of -1.  
• Using Every Resource: When the United States maintains a no-
concessions policy, it undermines any efforts to use every available 
resource to bring American citizens home. This clause reduces options and 
limits latitude during the negotiation process. The no-concessions rule 
clearly implies that it will deny terrorists any acts of concessions. This 
could be something very small or it could present itself in the form of 
ransom payments or prisoner releases. Having a policy that restricts 
negotiations places limits on using every resource to bring hostages home; 
therefore, policy A received a score of -1 for this category.  
• Applying Consistency & Equality: History has proven that a no-
concessions policy will be broken. This was seen in the Iran-Contra affair 
and in past U.S. prisoner exchanges. It also reduces the chance of applying 
the policy in an equitable manner. Because option A has been proven to 
lack consistency and equity in application, it received a score of -1. 
 
 57 
2. Option B: Capitulation or Safe-Release 
A policy of capitulation or safe-release is one of the most effective methods used 
to guarantee the quickest and safest return of hostages.207 The policy is based on 
acceding to all terrorist demands in hopes that terrorists will then return hostages safely. 
The policy allows for nations to use every resource for the safe return of their citizens, 
such as ransom payments and prisoner releases, which has been proven to save lives. It 
allows for a standard, equitable policy that applies to every person taken hostage. 
Capitulation removes the confusion that was seen when the United States chose to 
negotiate and conduct a prisoner exchange for Bowe Bergdahl but appeared to do nothing 
to help Foley and others.  
Notwithstanding its effectiveness to save lives, option B is politically unpopular 
because it appears weak on terrorism; without an effective counter-terrorism strategy of 
pursue, capture, or kill, and with no negotiation process, it could lead to repeated tactics. 
In the RAND study discussed previously, Brazil always paid concessions to secure the 
safe release of hostages; however, they were able to effectively prevent more hostages 
from being taken by actively pursuing and punishing hostage-takers. While this method 
works well within the confines of a nation’s own boundaries, it is hard to apply on a 
global level. Global terrorist organizations such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda operate outside the 
reach of many states, which makes an effective prevention counter-terrorism strategy 
difficult to implement. As the Report on U.S. Hostage Policy asserts, “hostage-takers 
increasingly operate in ungoverned spaces and unstable environments where access to 
U.S. officials is denied.”208 In spite of these obstacles, the new policy states that it will do 
everything in its power to bring hostage-takers to justice. PPD-30 specifically promises 
that the United States will deter hostage-taking by aggressive interdiction, investigation, 
and prosecution.209 This type of counter-terrorism strategy is necessary for policies that 
allow for the granting of concessions.  
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R2764.html. 
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In evaluating option B, the overall score was 0 (see Table 3).  
Table 3.   Policy Option B Evaluation 
 Policy Option B Capitulation 
Criterion  
Funding No Terrorism -1 
Deterring Hostage-taking -1 
Using Every Resource 1 
Applying Consistency & Equality 1 
  
Score Total 0 
 
• Funding No Terrorism: Its ability to pay all ransoms to guarantee the 
safe-release of hostages means that it will fund terrorism. Option B 
received a score of -1 in this category.  
• Deterring Hostage-taking: This policy will not deter hostage-taking. Its 
primary focus is on hostage recovery by conceding to demands; option B 
received a score of -1 in this category.  
• Using Every Resource: Option B allows use of every resource to ensure 
the safe return of hostages. It allows the payment of ransoms and other 
concessions. Because of this, it received a 1 in this category.  
• Applying Consistency & Equality: Capitulation polices are not 
complicated; they only require one thing, the granting of concessions to 
terrorists. Because of its simplicity it can be applied consistently and 
equally, and therefore received a 1 in this category. 
 
3. Option C: Removal of No-Concessions Language 
Option C scored well during the analysis. Policy option C removes the no-
concessions language and families’ ability to pay ransoms while strengthening America’s 
resolve in capturing or killing terrorists who participate in hostage-takings. This policy 
meets almost all of the criteria, save for deterring hostage-taking. As discussed 
throughout the thesis, and shown in data from the GTD, hostages will always be taken 
regardless of the policy, unless there is an existent fear of prosecution and punishment. 
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This policy option allows for effective negotiations and gives the United States 
the best capability of bringing hostages home safely without jeopardizing its credibility or 
image, making it a politically popular option. Conceding to concessions while having a 
rigid no-concessions policy not only opens an administration up to criticism, but also 
weakens convictions against terrorism. Removing the no-concessions rule eliminates the 
possibility of this policy violation.  
One of the main frames of the nation’s current policy is utilizing every resource—
“The United States will use every appropriate resource to gain the safe return of U.S. 
nationals who are held hostage.”210 Removing the no-concessions language allows this 
statement to be accurate. Using every resource does not mean automatically granting 
concessions. It gives negotiators the flexibility to use suitable tactics. Negotiation is an 
art form designed to build trust and establish a rapport in order to change behavior. 
Beginning negotiations with a list of non-negotiable items—like ransoms and prisoner 
exchanges—before a rapport is built is detrimental to the process and hinders resource 
use.  
Eliminating the no-concessions stipulation abolishes the possibility of inequalities 
that families have experienced. It allows for negotiations to treat every hostage situation 
equally. The Report on U.S. Hostage Policy stresses a holistic approach to hostage 
recovery.211 Allowing the U.S. government to directly negotiate with terrorists is a 
critical leap in this approach’s success; keeping the no-concessions policy in place 
permits violations for some but not others.  
The first established crisis negotiation team was founded in America based on 
police experiences with terrorist hostage-takings; however, even though police rarely 
negotiate with terrorists, the founding principles have been overwhelmingly successful 
when utilized. According to HOBAS, when negotiators utilize the contain-and-negotiate 
                                                 
210 White House, “Presidential Policy Directive.” 
211 White House, Report on U.S. Hostage Policy, 4. 
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strategy, 95 percent of incidents are resolved without loss of life.212 This policy option 
follows the proven successful American policing methods.  
In evaluating option C, the overall score was 1 (see Table 4).  
Table 4.   Policy Option C Evaluation 
 Policy Option C Language Removal 
Criterion  
Funding No Terrorism 0 
Deterring Hostage-taking -1 
Using Every Resource 1 
Applying Consistency & Equality 1 
  
Score Total 1 
 
• Funding No Terrorism: Option C received a 0 in this category because 
the outcome could not be determined. Removing the no-concessions 
language does not necessarily mean granting concessions. All topics, such 
as ransoms and prisoner releases, may be discussed during negotiations, 
though not necessarily agreed to. As such, it is undetermined if 
negotiations will lead to paying ransoms and funding terrorism.  
• Deterring Hostage-taking: As discussed previously, none of the policy 
options can truly eliminate all hostage-taking; therefore, policy C received 
a score of -1 for this criterion.  
• Using Every Resource: Policy C follows American policing methods for 
negotiating. By removing the no-concessions rule and the families’ ability 
to pay ransoms, it allows for the use of every resource. By allowing open 
negotiations that are not limited by a no-concessions rule, the United 
States will be able to negotiate effectively and use every resource to 
ensure the safe return of hostages. While tactical action should be used 
sparingly, it is part of negotiations, and as such is part of using every 
resource. Negotiations are useful in gathering intelligence and stalling for 
time so tactical teams can plan an assault that increases the likelihood of 
success. Removing the no-concessions rule and following American 
policing methods allows for the use of every available resource; therefore, 
policy C received a score of 1 in this category.  
                                                 
212 Wright, “A Decade after Waco,” 103. 
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• Applying Consistency & Equality: American policing methods treat 
every hostage situation the same way; the techniques and applications are 
applied consistently and equally to all hostages. For these reasons, option 
C scored a 1 for this criterion. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Terrorist hostage-takings have existed for over two millennia. With the invention 
of television, the news media, and the Internet, which provides instant social interaction, 
this type of terrorism has gained global notoriety in the past few decades. Many nations 
around the world, including the United States, have been battling terrorist hostage-takings 
by instituting no-concessions policies. The hope is that denying terrorists their demands 
will remove all incentives for hostage-taking, thereby eliminating it as an option. 
However, since the no-concessions policy has been instituted, research has shown that 
hostage-takings have steadily increased. This raises questions about whether or not this 
type of policy is deterring hostage-taking. More importantly, in light of the recent, highly 
publicized beheadings of hostages held by ISIS, would it not be a better policy to protect 
U.S. citizens who are being held hostage?  
The justifications for a no-concessions policy are based on the conviction that 
denying terrorists the “benefits of ransom, prisoner release, policy changes, or other acts 
concession” will interrupt the cycle of hostage-taking by removing all enticements and 
funding needed to continue attacks against the United States.213 However, hostages have 
value beyond these concessions, such as publicity; denying terrorists tangible benefits is 
insufficient to protect people from being taken hostage. Furthermore, as research has 
shown, the money that major terrorist groups receive from ransom payments is 
inconsequential compared to their overall funding sources. As a result, paying—or 
choosing not to pay—ransoms does little to prevent terrorists from continuing attacks. In 
addition, the research also revealed that the current U.S. policy for hostage-taking 
situations vis-à-vis terrorist funding is flawed. The U.S. policy now allows families the 
ability to negotiate directly with terrorists and pay ransoms with government assistance. 
While it has been proven that paying ransoms does not fund major terrorist organizations 
on a grand scale, the policy as written contradicts its mission. 
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Further contradictions to the no-concessions policy exist when examining the 
overall history of U.S. negotiations with terrorists. The United States has repeatedly 
violated its no-concessions policy. This was never more evident than in the Iran-Contra 
affair, during which the United States sold weapons in exchange for hostages, or the 
prisoner exchange of U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl for five Taliban detainees 
being held at Guantanamo Bay. Despite these glaring contradictions, the U.S. 
government chose to uphold its no-concessions policy when ISIS captured James Foley 
and Steven Sotloff—who were publicly beheaded after the United States refused to 
negotiate ransoms. The choice to negotiate for the release of Bergdahl but not of Foley 
and Sotloff has caused confusion and distrust over the policy’s equitability. Policies are 
put in place to be followed; when they are not, their integrity is jeopardized. These past 
events illustrate that the United States has violated its own policy. Recent policy changes 
attempted to address these inequities, but maintaining a no-concessions policy appears to 
have hindered such efforts. Contemporary U.S. history has demonstrated that a no-
concessions policy will continue to be violated; as such, it can never be consistently and 
equally applied during hostage situations.  
The research has exposed many flaws with the current U.S. policy. A policy 
options analysis was performed to determine how the new U.S. policy had impacted 
hostage recovery activities and what other policy options might best help the United 
States protect its citizens. Upon completion of the analysis, it was apparent that policy 
option B, removing the no-concessions language, was the best option for protecting U.S. 
citizens, as shown in Table 5. 
  
 65 
Table 5.   Policy Options Evaluation 





Criteria    
Funding No Terrorism -1 -1 0 
Deterring Hostage-taking -1 -1 -1 
Using Every Resource -1 1 1 
Applying Consistency & 
Equality -1 1 1 
    
Score Total -4 0 1 
 
As a result of this thesis, it is strongly recommended that the U.S. policy be 
reevaluated and designed to be more in line with the American policing methods; the no-
concessions language should be removed from the policy. In addition, because the 
research indicated that the fear of retribution can be a deterrent to hostage-taking, the 
United States should stress a pursue, capture, or kill policy for terrorists who commit 
hostage-takings. While it is impossible to prevent every hostage-taking incident, these 
recommendations will reduce the likelihood that U.S. citizens are taken hostage and, 
more importantly, better assist U.S. citizens when they are abducted. 
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